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Abstract
After more than fifty years, Indonesia remains muted in its acknowledgement of the killings 
and disappearances of nearly one million suspected leftists in the anti-Communist pogroms 
of 1965. While the downfall of Indonesian strongman Suharto had opened up a larger space 
for democracy, the Indonesian state remains reticent in facing accusations of mass human 
rights violations that have taken place during his rule. Although many former dissidents and 
political detainees have come forward with their stories in an effort to “straighten history,” they 
continue to face harassment from right wing groups as well as the state’s intelligence apparatus. 
Nevertheless, with the advent of the Internet, human rights activists as well as historical 
“revisionists” have begun to use the cyber sphere as way to fill in the “gaps” in terms of Indonesia’s 
narrative concerning the killings of 1965. This paper investigates the dynamics behind the use of 
this medium in transmitting this dark episode to a younger generation of Indonesians. It looks 
specifically at Ingat 1965, a website that utilizes “private memory” as a way to “resist” as well as 
reinvent the narrative, which has so long been dominated by the state. This paper also includes 
an investigation into how Indonesia is beginning to deal with its past. 
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INTRODUCTION
During the tumultuous months of September and October of 1965, a failed coup 
attempt in Indonesia brought about the deaths and disappearances of hundreds 
of thousands, if not millions, of suspected leftists in one of Southeast Asia’s most 
notorious “open secret.” These pogroms then brought about the New Order 
regime and its system of social control, which continues to reverberate throughout 
Indonesian society even until today. Part of this system of social control revolves 
around an elaborate national myth that the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia or the PKI) and organizations associated with it were culpable 
in this coup plot against the state. According to this narrative, the Indonesian 
body politic faced an imminent danger from Communism, which necessitated 
the subsequent incarceration and killings of almost a million people. However, 
even after the fall of President Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia 
has continued with an enforced form of “silence” which sanctifies the centrality of 
the state at the expense of truth concerning past human rights violations. Even as 
former dissidents and ex-political prisoners have come forward with their personal 
accounts, stories, and experiences, they continue to live in fear of harassment from 
the both the state as well as right-wing fringe groups. Nonetheless, human rights 
activists as well as historical revisionists have taken on the mantle of challenging 
the state’s narrative.
In this paper I will analyze the contents of a cyber “memorial” named Ingat 65 or 
“Remember 1965” showcasing stories written by Indonesians in their understanding 
of the event.1 This paper aims to investigate how the internet’s relative “openness” 
provides a place wherein the events of 1965 can be remembered under less 
restrictive conditions and, more importantly, debated. The paper will first provide 
a brief description of the 1965 killings. I will then provide an explanation of the 
strategies used in maintaining the “enforced silence” which surrounds the event. 
The paper will also provide an overview of attempts by victims, ex-dissidents, as well 
as ex-political prisoners, to tell their stories. It continues with a look at the state of 
the internet in Indonesia and its contribution to democratization. I will also show 
how this medium can also contribute to a greater understanding of the events of 
1965 beyond the official state narrative.  I will also consider what the internet can 
offer in terms of an environment which still remains inimical to open discussions 
of the events both during and after 1965. In this paper, I will conclude by stating 
that the internet and websites such as that of Ingat 65 serve as virtual monuments 
of remembrance but at the same time “spaces” where the history of 1965 can be 
interpreted in multiple ways. Utilizing the open and “amorphous” nature of the 
internet, sites such as Ingat 65, I posit, have the capacity to provide the “materiality” 
needed to keep the memories surrounding the event alive in an otherwise “silenced” 
landscape. By doing so memory is democratized and may potentially de-center 
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the myths surrounding one of Southeast Asia’s greatest instances of human rights 
violations. 
IN THE BEGINNING 
Between the late hours of September 30 until the early morning of October 1, 1965, 
seven high ranking military personnel, made up of six generals and an officer, 
were abducted. They were then murdered and their bodies subsequently dumped 
into a well near an air force base just an hour’s drive southeast of central Jakarta 
called Lubang Buaya or Crocodile Hole.2 Their murderers went on to make a radio 
announcement proclaiming themselves to be members of the September the 30th 
Movement (Gerakan 30 September or G30S) with a stated intent of protecting 
Indonesia’s first president Sukarno from a coup attempt by right-wing soldiers. 
In the early morning of October 1, 1965, a young general Suharto quickly moved 
his troops to suppress soldiers loyal to G30S. Just as they abruptly declared their 
intentions, their counter coup was over. When the bodies of the murdered officers 
were found and exhumed, General Suharto swore vengeance and initiated a “purge,” 
which would last for almost a year all over Indonesia. At the same time the “smiling” 
general also orchestrated a hate campaign against the communists, accusing them 
of being complicit in the murder of the army officers at Lubang Buaya.3 Before 1965, 
the PKI was the world’s third largest communist party after its Chinese and Soviet 
counterparts. Since the mid-1940s the PKI had uneasily shared the Indonesian 
political landscape with nationalists, religious groups, as well as the armed forces 
under Sukarno’s model of “Guided Democracy.” Its political power was perceived 
as a threat not only to the forces Sukarno had so precariously balanced during the 
Guided Democracy years but also to the avowedly anti-communist nations of the 
US and Great Britain. Within the context of the Cold War, Indonesia turning “red” 
would only serve to further strengthen the West’s “domino theory” paranoia and 
thus the “neutralization” of the PKI and communism was seen as a necessity.4
Holding power and having Sukarno as a patron, the PKI were only barely 
tolerated, but once the events of September 30, 1965 were set in motion, the fate of 
the party and its associated wings, as well as its members, were sealed. The purge 
would devour anyone with even the slightest association to the party. This would 
include farmers, writers, politicians, factory workers, and ethnic Chinese.  The 
largest number of those incarcerated and “disappeared” were from the islands of 
Sumatra, Java, and Bali. The last batch of political prisoners and detainees, which 
numbered in the millions, were only released toward the end of the 1970s.
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Following the events of 1965, General Suharto went on to become the second 
president of Indonesia who held on to the reins of power for thirty over years until 
his downfall was brought about by the reformasi or reform movement in 1998. It was 
during this period of three decades that Suharto earned himself the reputation of 
being Southeast Asia’s foremost strongman, having survived through deft political 
maneuvering while utilizing a slew of authoritarian measures to maintain control. 
The longevity of his New Order regime was also due in part to a combination of 
state-sanctioned violence with an almost totalitarian form of ideology based on the 
demonization and hatred of the PKI. In essence, the foundations of Suharto’s New 
Order regime were built on the lives of those incarcerated, tortured, and murdered 
following the fateful events of September 30, 1965.
According to Indonesianist Ariel Heryanto, Suharto’s New Order regime 
projected onto to the Indonesian populace a “simulacra” or a “reality/disreality” 
through various mediums and myriad forms of indoctrination. The media was 
heavily censored and publications were vetted in case they should carry ideas, 
which could threaten the Indonesian state. Books on communism were banned 
and the PKI condemned to a kind of damnatio memoriae, where mention of its 
name as well as history would bring about the state’s wrath. In fact, the works of 
Indonesian author Ananta Pramoedya Toer, a Nobel Prize for Literature nominee 
and a well-known leftist figure, were banned well into the late 1990s.5 The New 
Order regime also constructed a series of elaborate structures and museums which 
showcased the alleged “evil” perpetrated by the PKI. Infamous amongst these 
structures was the Sacred Pancasila Monument opened in 1972 to commemorate 
the military officers murdered.6 Beneath the gigantic bronze statues erected in 
their memory lies a plaque, which details the manner in which members of the 
PKI’s women’s wing  Gerwani or Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, ostensibly murdered 
the generals. According to New Order lore, the military officers had their eyes 
gouged out, tortured, and finally murdered in a blood soaked orgy and their bodies 
then dumped into a well.7 This imagery, designed to highlight the “insolence” of the 
PKI, was further bolstered by a film entitled Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI produced 
in the early 1980s by famed Indonesian director Arifin C. Noer.8 Its viewing was 
mandatory for more than twenty over years up until 1998, and school children had 
to endure the violent scenes depicting the torture of the military personnel as well 
as one particularly inflammatory scene where PKI supporters were shown stepping 
on a copy of the sacred al-Quran. In a Muslim-majority nation, the portrayal of the 
PKI as Quran-stomping fanatics was precisely engineered to incite hatred and deep 
suspicion against the party. This state-sanctioned form of demonization utilized 
by the New Order regime not only made an “other” of former PKI members but 
also forbade any group or individual from agitating for democracy, free speech, 
and human rights. During the period of Suharto’s administration, his New Order 
government was actively engaged in arbitrary detentions, extra-judicial murders 
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of political, labor, and human rights activists, perpetuating what Ariel Heryanto 
refers to as state terror. In justification, the state claimed that these were actions 
necessary to protect Indonesia from individuals and “formless organizations” 
antagonistic to its development.
Coupled with the Pancasila or five principles, which were at the core of the New 
Order’s ideology, citizens could then be cohesively bound to the state and its goals.9 
Throughout the period of Suharto’s rule, Indonesians were “conditioned by the 
dominance of the New Order official history and training in the regime’s version of 
Pancasila ideology, [they] believe that ‘1965’ was a climatic and desperate moment 
of national treachery and crisis when the only option was ‘kill or be killed’ and have 
little incentive to reconsider this received wisdom” (Zurbuchen 15). Thus, for many 
years, the New Order’s dominant discourse was what defined official “memory— 
relegating anything discordant with its vision to oblivion. However, in 1998, a series 
of violent protests rocked the core of the Suharto’s regime. Beginning with the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis and with allegations of his corrupt practices, Suharto 
resigned in September 1998, ending his and the New Order’s thirty-year long rule 
(Pang).
The end of the New Order, however, did not bring about an “age” of reform. 
Indonesia’s democratic transition continues to be mired in realpolitik, hampered 
by existing power structures fostered by the three decades long New Order. Mary 
Zurbuchen states that “the country can be said to have begun a transition from 
authoritarianism, yet Suharto’s resignation in 1998, dramatic as it was, turned out 
to be neither unambiguous nor decisive in terms of the ‘reform agenda’” (15).
Today, many of Suharto’s associates continue to wield considerable power and 
the armed forces remain an important player in national politics. Even though there 
were attempts to decentralize governance in post-authoritarian Indonesia, scholars 
have warned that such reforms did not necessarily bring about positive outcomes. 
Vedi Hadiz states that, “the relationship between decentralisation, democracy 
and transparent and accountable governance is . . . essentially problematic and 
contentious” and that there continues be vested interests in “resisting many 
institutional reforms or have usurped them in [a] number of creative ways” (12). 
This “resistance” within Indonesia’s institutions of the state to reform is perhaps one 
of the greatest obstacles to any meaningful exorcism of the ghosts of past human 
rights violations. This is something even beyond the powers of an Indonesian 
president as I will show in the next section. 
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THE APOLOGY: ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND 1965
During the short-lived administration of Indonesia’s fourth president, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, from 1999 until 2001, the controversial politician made an unprecedented 
move in apologizing to the hundreds of thousands of Indonesians affected by the 
events of 1965.10 In a further shock to the political establishment, Abdurrahman, 
a former Muslim cleric, sought to make amends by recommending that a truth 
commission be formed to investigate not only the events of 1965 but also of other 
several high-profile cases of human rights violations. While many human rights and 
civil society organizations lauded his pronouncements, others especially within his 
own Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) expressed unease over what was believed to be not only 
the “rehabilitation” of the PKI but also the revival of the issue that could “rekindle 
. . . past conflict [and] result in new tensions in society” (Fealy and McGregor 38). 
These tensions hark back to the period of Sukarno’s period of “Guided Democracy” 
where nationalist groups, Muslim groups, the PKI, and the army were competing 
furiously for power and resources. Balancing these powerful competing forces 
under the rubric of NASAKOM (nasionalisme, agama, komunisme), Sukarno 
maintained that nationalism, religion, and communism could coexist in Indonesia. 
After September 30, 1965, Sukarno’s carefully crafted power sharing arrangement 
fell apart. With the assistance of the army, nationalist and Muslim groups associated 
with Abdurrahman Wahid’s NU went on a murderous spree of killing from central 
to eastern Java lasting several months.11 Most of their victims were those with 
alleged links to the PKI and its associated groups. Therefore, to have a revered 
leader such as Abdurrahman of the fifty million strong NU apologize was to attest 
not only the innocence of the victims of the pogroms but also, more importantly, 
an admission of guilt on the role of NU.
The events of 1965 served as the master narrative for Suharto’s New Order with a 
price paid for by the lives of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians. With the state’s 
narrative emphasizing the supreme sacrifice made by the seven military officers and 
whitewashing the “neutralization” of the PKI, a seal of silence was placed over the 
fates of those branded as enemies of the state. Even after the downfall of Suharto, 
the silence remained and it was only several years later that Indonesians began to 
slowly sift through the many layers of Indonesia’s history. Since the Suharto brand 
had become synonymous with a brutal dictatorship, Indonesians started to revisit 
those years of authoritarian rule. The New Order regime began as a singular act 
of violence, but it continued to employ violence also as a means to “silence” any 
form of dissent. The New Order regime had left behind a landscape pockmarked 
by “gaps” and “absences” in the stories of those brave enough to challenge the 
authorities during that period. Therefore, this period of the early 2000s was an 
attempt to fill in the empty spaces left behind by the New Order. At the same time, 
voices calling for justice and reparations also emerged.
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In 2000, the lower house of the Indonesian legislature passed a resolution on 
the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Prompted by an effort 
on the part of civil society, the bill was finally passed in 2004, empowering the 
commission to encompass the events of 1965 as well as other cases of human rights 
violations during the New Order period. However, given the “inadequacies” cited 
by civil society groups, the law was then brought to Indonesia’s Constitutional 
Court to be reviewed.
According to these groups, the law could possibly contravene the rights of victims 
through the proposed commission’s power to grant amnesties, disallowing certain 
cases from being tried before courts, and only providing victims with compensation 
should perpetrators be given amnesty (Derailed). Six years later, the Constitutional 
Court did indeed find that the law contravened Indonesia’s constitution. However, 
instead of recommending that changes be made, the entire law was annulled. 
“Factions implicated in past violations welcomed the decision and the credibility 
of the Indonesian judiciary, notoriously prone to political interference and 
corruption, took another blow” (Derailed 30). This particular incident is part of 
a larger malaise where the state enforces upon itself an institutionalized form of 
forgetting or even denial that these crimes had happened. Similarly, Spain’s 1975 
democratic transition after the death of the dictator, Franciso Franco, could only 
go forward after a pact of forgetting or el pacta el olvido was agreed upon between 
the former strongman’s supporters and proponents of democracy. For many years, 
successive Spanish administrations were hampered in dealing with the issue of past 
crimes committed during the three-year civil war that began in 1936, followed by 
Franco’s brutal rule from 1939 to 1975. However, in 2007, the Spanish government 
under the Socialist Workers Party promulgated a law on “historical memory” to 
actively revisit Spain’s dark past. This was in part due to a burgeoning new idiom 
influenced by human rights discourse and what civil society organizations terms as 
an attempt at “recovering” that period in Spain’s history (de Menezes 12).
What is even more interesting in comparing Spain’s with Indonesia’s own 
“recovering” process is that both countries are embroiled in controversies 
surrounding the politics of “disappeared bodies.” Civil society organizations in 
Spain have recently begun exhuming mass graves and their actions have “thrown 
the country into an unexpected public debate exposing conflicting political cultures, 
both from an ideological and generational viewpoint” (Ferrandiz and Baer). The 
generation born during the 1960s “were to learn that the country’s much touted 
democratization and modernization were founded on neglected yet unquiet graves” 
(Ferrandiz and Baer).
In 2001, a group of activists in Wonosobo, in the central Indonesian island of 
Java, also wanted to exhume and then re-bury some of the remains of alleged PKI 
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members who had been executed. Their plans, however, were disrupted when 
a group of religious fanatics and locals intervened physically, threatening those 
involved in the exhumations. These groups then accused the exhumation team of 
wanting to revive the PKI (McGregor, “Mass Graves”). As a result, civil society 
groups have now become more cautious in terms of any further exhumations. State 
and fringe right-wing groups have made sure that any such effort to “dig up the past” 
will not continue on the basis that it offends religious sentiment and that the PKI 
continues to be illegal. However, what is interesting to note is that in Wonosobo, 
younger activists from NU, the Muslim organization accused of being involved in 
the killings, had also been involved in the exhumation process. In interviews with 
these activists, historian Katherine McGregor posits that an “inter-generational” 
memory prompts them into dig deeper into Indonesia’s past (“Memory Studies” 
352). Much like in Spain, anthropologist Alison Ribeiro de Menezes has pointed to a 
“new memory paradigm” centered on “ruined bodies and ruptured genealogies” (24). 
Therefore, appearance of evidence of past crimes has forced Spaniards living in the 
present to revisit the atrocities committed during Franco’s time as well as during 
the Civil War. What is also fascinating is that a discourse on “broken” generations, 
which began with a journalist searching for the remains of his grandfather, sparked 
a movement which saw the unravelling of the country’s pact of silence.
Efforts to exhume these “ruined bodies” have proven too controversial, eliciting 
responses from right-wing groups and the state. Despite Indonesia’s democratic 
transition, the shadow of the New Order continues to haunt the Indonesian political 
landscape. Thus, the state and society at large continue to remain antagonistic to 
any efforts at its own recuperacion or recuperation. However, a younger generation 
of Indonesians seems to be becoming more cognizant of this “ruptured genealogy” 
caused by the gap in the New Order’s meta-narrative and historiography. How 
are Indonesians who are growing up in post-Suharto Indonesia dealing with this 
“rupture”? What kinds of medium are they reaching out to “fill in the gaps”? What 
are the kinds of stories they tell? 
AN ACT OF KNOWING 
In April 2016, a three-day government-sanctioned “symposium” was held in Jakarta, 
which some media reports claimed was a breakthrough in knocking down the 1965 
“barrier.”12 Non-governmental organizations, government officials, and former 
political detainees attended, and topics once thought to be taboo were laid open 
in the media limelight.13 At the end of the symposium, a report was compiled and 
then sent to the office of the current Indonesian president, Joko Widodo. However, 
even then, right-wing fringe elements continued to protest against the event with 
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crowds venting their anger at images of the ghosts of PKI.14 For the time being, the 
government seems to have cooled off in pushing the matter any further.15 However, 
a separate initiative has been set up under the president’s office to deal with past 
human rights abuses in a “non-judicial” way. Referred to as the “Reconciliation 
Committee,” it is comprised of a select group from the National Human Rights 
Commission, other government representatives, as well as human rights victims 
and their families.  Following this, the government has also stated that it would 
also form a so-called National Harmony Council (Dewan Kerukunan Nasional), 
but it was chaired by former general Wiranto, who himself had been accused of war 
crimes during his tenure as a commanding officer in East Timor.16 The Indonesian 
state continues to hold a “bi-polar” stance where certain individuals support 
dealing with past human rights violations, even if only in a non-judicial level, but 
the detractors of this move to address the violations are probably greater. Given 
this situation, activists from outside Indonesia have boldly taken the step of doing 
this on “their own.” 
THE INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL
In 2015, academics and groups of Indonesians who had been exiled since 1965 in 
Europe organized the International People’s Tribunal where the Indonesian state 
was literally placed on the docket.17 In this mock trial arranged to coincide with 
the fiftieth anniversary of the incident, the Indonesian state was accused of crimes 
against humanity with political exiles and former political prisoners playing the 
part of the accusers. Toward the end of the tribunal, a chosen panel of expert 
judges and judicial scholars passed sentence on Indonesia, finding the state guilty 
of engineering the 1965 massacres. Indonesian members of the tribunal would 
later be accused by right-wing groups of being disloyal citizens.18 In fact much of 
the pressure could also be indirectly attributed to two documentaries made by 
filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer who brought to an international audience the faces 
of the murderers responsible for killing suspected PKI members. Spending nearly 
ten years in the Indonesian island of Sumatra, Oppenheimer managed to persuade 
the alleged murderers to confess to the crimes they had committed, as shown in his 
two documentaries. Through The Act of Killing and its sequel, The Look of Silence, 
Oppenheimer forced Indonesians to confront a historical event which so many 
had simply chosen to push into a dark crevasse.19 What was particularly effective in 
Oppenheimer’s two films was the use of personal stories, narratives, and memories 
which brought forth the impact 1965 had on the lives of ordinary Indonesians.20 
Unlike the dramatic depiction of the deaths of the seven military officers and the 
murderous groups responsible for their deaths through state propaganda, 1965 had 
a human cost which resonated across Indonesian society. This echo effect is often 
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found within the private realm. Throughout the period of the New Order regime, 
personal recollections and stories of the events of 1965 had often been kept within a 
“whispering range” where only close family and friends could engage in such taboo 
discussions. After the fall of Suharto, academic texts, books, memoirs provided a 
space for these “whispers” to extend beyond the private realm for those directly 
affected by the events of 1965.21 There have also been many instances where forums, 
seminars, and other performances have broached this topic. 
Former political prisoners and their families, in the more liberal period of the 
early 2000s, were able to tell their stories openly for the first time, despite the 
continued threat posed to them by right-wing religious groups who branded them 
as “new style communists.”22 Oppenheimer’s two productions have also pushed 
the events of 1965 into the international arena, after being nominated for several 
awards overseas. Given the knowledge that the mass killings in Indonesia is not as 
“well-known” as the Cambodia genocide, Oppenheimer has placed the events of 
1965 into the gaze of the international community.  
All of these events have prompted a younger generation of Indonesians, adept 
in the ways of the digital age, to come to terms with the many gaps of Indonesian 
history. A website named Ingat 65 or Remember 65 has provided them a space to 
share and create, a space where they are allowed to openly question and dissect 
not only the New Order regime but also the current Indonesian historiography. 
However, before going further into a discussion of the content of Ingat 65, I will 
first embark on a short description of the rise of the internet and its impact on 
Indonesian society.
THE INTERNET AND CREATING SPACES
The media during the Suharto period was perceived as an extension of the Indonesian 
state. The radio, television, cinema, newspapers, and other domestic publications 
were part of a superstructure put in place to ensure that the citizenry would remain 
compliant and accepting of the state’s ideology. According to Merlyna Lim, “the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia saw telecommunications and media as 
tools for ‘development’, which was promoted as a central means of legitimizing 
the regime in power notably the New Order regime of President Suharto” (Lim 
116). Ironically, it was the Indonesian state’s very pursuit of development, which 
heralded the end of its monopoly and control over the media. In the 1990s, the 
government introduced satellite communications and digital technology into its 
panoply of “development” projects, leading to Indonesia’s entry into the internet 
age: the warnet. An abbreviation for warung internet, these internet cafes were 
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ubiquitous in the mid-nineties up until the early twentieth century and provided 
ordinary Indonesians with unfettered access to news and information. More 
importantly, warnets enabled users to transcend the traditional informational 
boundaries demarcated by the state. Traditionally, the government was able to 
retain control over information as Indonesian law stipulates that the Ministry of 
Information must first license all media outlets before they can operate. However, 
due to the amorphous nature of the internet as well as confusion over which ministry 
should have final authority, Indonesia’s virtual realm was allowed to “evolve” within 
an environment relatively free of government regulation or interference (Sen and 
Hill). This was also largely due to the state’s belief that the internet was not so much 
a threat but rather a tool of technological progress and advancement. 
Given the space the internet provided, users were not only able to circumvent 
government censors; there was also ample opportunity for groups to congregate 
and create virtual communities. As Indonesia’s economy began to expand in the 
nineties, so did demands for increased political space. Allegations of state-level 
corruption increased the gulf between Suharto’s regime and a citizenry desiring 
greater transparency. Always at the forefront of socio-political change, the calls 
for democratization galvanized a young generation of Indonesians comprised 
of students and activists who took advantage of what the internet could offer. 
Through list servers and chat sites, not only did the internet provide much of these 
younger Indonesians the space to express themselves—something the New Order 
had denied them—but it also allowed them to speak in a new “vernacular.” The 
Suharto regime, according to Indonesianist Michael Bodden, could no longer 
provide Indonesians the “proper” language to understand their nation. He points 
to the popularity of “radical” forms of avant-garde performing arts and literature 
which exposed the painful contradictions between the New Order’s emphasis on 
economic development and its human rights violations. 
The internet became a conduit for resistance against the Suharto regime, 
providing a previously non-existent space for news and information from outside 
to flow in.23 The media in Indonesia is now thriving due to Indonesia’s democratic 
reform, and the internet has become an important element within the nation’s 
vibrant, growing political space. Nonetheless, even with political liberalization, 
Indonesia continues to wrestle with its past. Discussions of past human rights 
abuses, especially the pogroms of 1965, continue to be taboo; however, there are 
stirrings. While the earlier generation of young activists had advocated for change 
through the internet, creating a “language” beyond the New Order regime’s 
“development” narrative, Indonesia’s own millennial generation are also beginning 
to take stock of the nation’s “being.” The internet has provided a “confessional-like” 
space not only calling into question the nature of Indonesian history but also the 
“damage” done by the New Order propaganda. 
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NEW SITES, NEW SPACES
In this section, I will begin to further analyze how the internet has provided 
the necessary space for the events of 1965 to be openly discussed. Here I will be 
providing a brief description of a confessional site entitled Ingat 65 but, more 
importantly, I will also provide analysis into its content. Before I do so, I will briefly 
provide an overview of biographical works that have sought to undermine the New 
Order myth, something that Ingat 65 is also doing but through the printed medium. 
Biographies and memoirs have become a popular medium since the fall 
of Suharto’s New Order regime especially for those who had previously been 
incarcerated during its rule. According to Vanessa Hearman, the height of these 
publications were between the period of 1999 to 2004.  After years of living under 
the New Order’s “panoptical” state, the post-Reformasi environment provided the 
impetus for many of its victims to “straighten” history through the publication of 
books on their lives and experiences. Hearman points out that the power of these 
memoirs and biographies lay in their capacity to “rewrite” the past in an “environment 
where history has been controlled and manufactured by those in power” (18). 
She adds that “tapping into these sources enable researchers to examine victim-
based narratives of violent events and examine how, after a democratic transition, 
representations of the past continue to be molded by the legacy of authoritarian 
rule” (18). A sample of these works would include would include Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer’s A Mute’s Soliloquy which chronicles his experiences as a political prisoner. 
This is also to be read in tandem with Hersri Setiawan’s Memoar Pulau Buru (The 
Buru Island Memoir), also based on the writer’s personal experiences as a prisoner 
of the New Order regime. Pramoedya’s and Setiawan’s memoirs provide a blow-
by-blow account of their incarceration, but it is also interesting to note that the 
descendants of eks-tapol or former political detainees have also entered the fray. 
For instance, Ribka Tjiptaning Proletariyati in her Aku Bangga Jadi Anak PKI 
(I am Proud to be a PKI Child) speaks of her life story as an antithesis to the 
stigmatizing effect of being a PKI child. Narrating her family’s destruction at the 
hands of the New Order regime to how she rose up into the upper echelons in 
Indonesian politics, her life, as she puts, has been one of victory rather than shame. 
Another fascinating entry in this genre is Nani Nurrachman Sutojo’s Kenangan Tak 
Terucap Aku Ayah dan Tragedi 1965 (Unspoken Memories, Me, My Father and the 
1965 Tragedy). Nani Nurrachman’s story is one of a personal journey as she comes 
to terms with her father’s death, one of the seven army officers murdered during 
the events of September 30. Her story is intimately tied into the national narrative, 
where her father General Sutojo Siswomiharjo continues to “serve the nation” in 
his role as a martyr immortalized at the Museum of PKI Treachery at the Lubang 
Buaya Memorial. Her book, however, adopts a strategy where, through personal 
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anecdotes and stories, she holds on to memories of her father simply as a human 
being. From the eyes of these “children of 65” it seems that the burden of past 
continues to affect them even across socio-economic and political spectrums. 
These biographical works disrupt the New Order’s lionized authoritarian national 
narrative through an intimate and human view of the lives of those affected by the 
events of 1965 while also showcasing their struggle to survive those years. However, 
a younger generation of Indonesians are also attempting to bring the issue into the 
virtual realm. 
Ingat 65 was brought about through the efforts of eleven young Indonesians, 
most of whom are journalists, attempting to “enlighten” younger Indonesians. 
According to the site’s chief editor Prodita Sabarini:
our hope is that young people would think about this part of history more because 
they are the biggest population in Indonesia. They have a say in what is going to happen 
in the future and so if most of the young people have their eyes open, express that they 
care about the past, they can get the government to do something about it and not be 
silent. (Sabarini, personal interview)
Founded in March 2016, the site has since accumulated thousands of hits. Sabarini 
adds that the Ingat 65 is meant to be a “movement” where individual submissions 
would snowball, with one author inspiring another to write and contribute. 
When we started out we wanted to get well known authors to write about this 
issue and then from there we were hoping that other younger people would also start 
contributing. (Sabarini, personal interview)
Prodita’s inspiration in setting up the website is itself reflective of Ingat 65’s method 
in sourcing for stories. She states, 
I was inspired to do this after reading the article of a young Indonesian in 
discussing the issue of 1965 and also of a graphic artist whose works touch on the 
issue. (Sabarini, personal interview)
After writing an article reflecting on the events of 1965, Prodita was herself 
interviewed by another journalist who posed the question to her as to what the 
younger generation should do. 
So I answered that the younger generation should organize themselves, use 
the internet but at the same time I felt I was speaking to an imaginary person but 
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I felt as if that imaginary person was me, so I should be doing that, and that’s why 
me and friends got together to do this. (Sabarini, personal interview)
Sabarini adds that the site would seek one new author every week with at least 
four new articles every month and those who had already contributed would not 
be allowed to recontribute, ensuring originality in each written submission. Other 
comparable websites include 1965setiaphari.org, with its contents coming from 
various authors but the length of its featured stories and its upload schedule are 
staggered. Its stories are shorter but, unlike Ingat 65, it also includes more “literary” 
entries such as poems. Another fascinating website is genosidapolitik1965.blogspot.
com, which not only features stories but also serves as a gallery of art pieces. It is 
also an archive of materials on the events of 1965, curated by visual artist Andreas 
Iswinarto, who had previously worked as a human rights activist. Iswinarto, a self-
educated artist, is part of a larger arts community referred to as Galeri Lentera 
Pembebasan or the Lantern in the Hill Gallery.
Ingat 65 began in early 2016 with its stated mission:
1. To inspire the generation born after 1965 to remember and to understand Indonesian 
history through their families/communities as well as personal memories 
2. To provide a space for Indonesians born after 1965 to share personal stories on how 
this period had affected their lives
3. To collate a collection of personal stories on how 1965 has influenced family and 
communal life in Indonesia as an act of collective memory 
4. To inspire the post-65 generation to engage in discussions with their families, friends, 
teachers, neighbours and colleagues on the impact of impunity in Indonesia from the 
perspective of 1965.
5. To create a forum for the younger generation to voice out their aspirations on what 
national leaders can do in terms of Indonesia’s national history and how its people 
may gain greater consciousness in questioning its dark past. (Sabarini, “Misi Ingat65”)
At the secondary level the Ingat 65 team is also intent on combatting Indonesia’s 
culture of impunity. Its editorial statement reads, 
forgetting the killings, torture and arrests of more than a million people in 1965 
entrenches the culture of impunity in Indonesia. Impunity occurs when the perpetrators 
of violence escape from the arms of the law. While those in power profit from this, the 
impact on citizens is extremely negative. State violence, bad governance, economic 
inequality and environmental degradation are all part of its legacy. (Sabarini, “Mengingat 
1965”)
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Since the foundation of the New Order state after the events of September 1965, 
there have been many instances of extra-judicial killings and suppression of calls 
for reforms. Even towards the end of Suharto’s rule, twelve activists disappeared 
due to their involvement in political activities against the New Order regime.24 
However, these cases continue to be kept in “cold storage” despite Indonesia’s 
National Human Rights Commission pressuring the state’s security apparatus to 
reveal the facts. As such, Ingat 65 is an attempt not only to remember but also to 
understand and bring to light the unspeakable aspects of Indonesia’s history.
Ingat 65 has since managed to collate more than thirty stories with contributions 
mostly from young Indonesians, all of which were born after 1965 and had grown 
up after the fall of the Suharto regime. One constant theme, which also runs 
throughout these stories on the website, is the sense of incredulity of being left 
in the dark on the events of 1965. Ingat 65’s editorial statement adds that they are 
“doing this because [they] grew up without knowing about the killings and arrest of 
nearly half a million people in Indonesia. And when [they] found out [they] were 
shocked. How was it that [their] elders did not tell [them]? Maybe they were forced 
to be silent by someone” (Sabarini, personal interview).
RUPTURES AND SILENCES 
Ingat 65 provides a fascinating look into “ruptures.” For instance, Teressa Wariato, 
in her essay, states that history is “not just a simple formula where 1+1=2. I am 
trying to solve the puzzle of what happened in the year of 1965. Yes, massacres 
had happened. But how many? Were there thousands, hundreds of thousands or 
millions and who killed them? Was it the Indonesian armed forces, Suharto or 
whom?” In the case of Indonesia, the “ruptures” refer to the unspeakability of the 
killings in 1965 and the subsequent silences which follow generations after the fact. 
The post-1965 generations continue to live with “ghosts” that haunt, contradictorily, 
through the presence and the invisibility of that period in Indonesian history. This 
phenomenon could best be explained by the concept of “postmemory.” Utilizing 
it as a framework to understand the experiences of the children of holocaust 
survivors, Marianne Hirsch states that postmemory “describes the relationship 
that the generation after those who witnessed cultural or collective trauma bears 
to the experience of those who came before, experiences that they ‘remember’ 
only by means of the stories, images and behaviors among which they grew up” 
(106). Hirsch adds that the events of the past continue to echo in the present. But 
within the Indonesian context, the past travels into the present as “ruptures” and 
“uncomfortable silences,” which forms part of the imagined historical landscape.
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According to Efrial Ruliandi Silalahi, his journey across a bridge on a river as an 
eight-year old child elicits such a historical “rupture.” 
We were travelling to celebrate the holidays. We were going home on a bus. We 
crossed a long bridge. The river beneath was so wide. I asked my father: Dad, what’s the 
name of this river? Dad answered: this river is called Snake River. Are they many snakes 
here? Is that why its given this name? My father was taken aback. He changed the topic 
of our conversation. I knew my father was keeping something from me.
His mother then explained that the Snake River was inhabited by a pair of white 
crocodiles which could take on human form and preyed on the villagers living 
nearby. It was only much later, after being admitted into a teachers’ college, did 
Efrial discover that the Snake River was an execution site for political prisoners: “It 
was then I understood why my parents did not tell me the truth. They knew it was 
a place where many political detainees were killed. Nonetheless, they had remain 
silent because the New Order was still in power.”
Silence was a strategy employed by many Indonesians to ensure that the 
authorities would not implicate them. It was an essential survival tactic meant to 
ensure everyone’s safety from the government’s campaign of neutralizing those 
that come from “unclean environments.” Parents and the generation with direct 
experience of the 1965 pogroms were careful to ensure that neither they nor their 
children would be associated with the PKI in anyway. This stigmatization could 
doom three generations.25 Political prisoners, depending on the severity of their 
alleged crimes, would not only suffer from state-sanctioned forms of violence, 
which included denial of access to jobs within the civil service, the media, and 
public funded universities; they would also have to regularly report to the 
authorities. Their offspring would also be subject to the same restrictions. What 
was more frightening is the prospect of social stigmatization. Indonesian culture, 
like many places in Southeast Asia, puts great importance on communal relations. 
Being administratively branded as “unclean” marks individuals and their family, 
resulting in social death for them.
Zuhana Anibuddin Zuhra recounts her time in elementary school, where she 
had a classmate who was anak PKI or a PKI child. 
His name was Winarno, but I would call him Nano. He was a small child who would 
spend his days in elementary school looking sad with his head bowed. It wasn’t his fault 
he was born as a child of a Class-B ex-political prisoner. The people in our village knew 
about his life story. It wasn’t difficult to forget, what more in a small village in East Java. 
Nano would serve as an example whenever the children in the village misbehaved. But 
he was often the quiet and studious one in class. It was as if his body had been given a 
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permanent tattoo and it would not disappear. The stereotype stuck and was not easily 
forgotten by most people. ‘Don’t be naughty in school. Do you want to be like Nano? 
He’s a PKI child!’
The stigmatization of political prisoners and their families served a clear purpose of 
creating a distinct category and class of peoples who would serve as the convenient 
and clear “other.”26 In Cambodia, another Southeast Asian nation, a similar strategy 
was employed with disastrous consequences.27 In Indonesia, the “other” could 
provide a fractious nation the much needed “glue” to maintain national unity as 
well, based primarily on fear and silence. However, as Zuhana herself realizes, these 
forms of national indoctrination raises inherent contradictions and questions. 
She asks, “what the government has forgotten is the possibility that when these 
questions appear at a young age, this will force them to look for answers when 
they grow up.” In these ruptures and breakages itself lie an inherent need to seek 
answers so as to “fill in” these gaps. In an unpublished paper, I referred to this as 
“politics of nothingness,” referring to an absence within the official narrative, which 
can adequately explain the need for such punitive measures.28 
The fear and silence from the older generation seeps down to the next like a kind 
of inherited “shame.” What I posit is that in trying to rid themselves of this “shame,” 
the present generation through efforts such as Ingat 65 is inserting their own stories 
into this nothingness, to the fill in the part of which the previous generation was so 
reluctant to speak about. In a sense, these young activists from Ingat 65 form what 
Tessa Morris-Suzuki would refer as an implicated generation.29 According to her, 
“later generations though they may not have been responsible for causing historical 
acts of violence or oppression, are often beneficiaries of the results of those actions” 
(26). Thus, they become enmeshed in the New Order system and it would seem 
that their “lives thus continue to be shaped by the oppressive institutions built on 
a history of violence, and will continue to be so unless [they] act to change them” 
(26).
Change is to ensure that the burden of the past would not bear down on future 
generations. This can be shown by returning to Zuhana’s story: “Aside from finding 
answers to questions I had as a child, I am also preparing myself for the time when 
my children will ask similar questions about this event so that I would not stutter 
and hide the truth. Its feels heavy when as child you are filled with questions and 
faced with absurdity.” Thus, in searching for the truth, the narratives presented by 
Zuhana and other contributors could be seen as an attempt to seek freedom from 
being “implicated” in the crimes of the past.
Historian Asvi Warman Adam coined the term “straightening history” in 2004 
to express the need for Indonesian history to be more plural and for its writing not 
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to lie exclusively within the ambit of the state. This process seems to be underway, 
and Ingat 65, among others, has been trying to “straighten out” Indonesian history 
as much as possible. In addition, this term has also become part of the lexicon used 
by former political prisoners to justify their demands for reparation, restitution, 
and the recovery of their good name. Terms such as justice, human rights, and 
even reconciliation, have provided a discursive map, allowing the eks-tapol to 
break from their “enforced silence.” In a fascinating study on a group eks-tapol, 
Andrew Conroe writes about their efforts to bring a case against the state in 2005 
demanding for restitution. While the case was later rejected, Conroe states that 
the very action itself returned to them a sense of agency. More importantly, it 
communicated to their descendants their stories, from their side, unencumbered 
by the state’s narrative.
As such discussions on Indonesian history is certainly becoming more 
cacophonous, and therefore a more appropriate term should be a “branching” 
rather than a “straightening” of history.  Doing so “narrativizes” their lives not only 
to regain their humanity but also to reconnect them with the next generation. As 
such, there needs to be more spaces such as Ingat 65 to show that “silence” is no 
longer an option and that everyone has a right to their own stories.
VIOLENT VISIONS AND GHOSTS
Arifin C. Noer’s  four-hour long Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI or the “Treachery of the 
G30S/PKI” shown every September 30th became the authoritative visual source 
of information on the events of 1965 for an entire generation. The film employed 
a great amount of gore, blood, and violence to implant violent imagery into the 
minds of young schoolchildren with the ultimate aim of creating hatred against 
the PKI. The scenes involved graphic depiction torture and grisly murders of the 
generals. According to Ananda Badudu, one such former student who saw the film, 
“[it] was so effective that [he] can still remember scene after scene of the movie even 
after all these years. The film made certain that the PKI were demons who came to 
earth—evil, malevolent without any sense of humanity . . . . it never crossed [his] 
mind . . . to even ask why the government made the movie compulsory viewing for 
all Indonesians including little children who should not even be watching sadistic 
movies.”
It was only when Ananda began his university studies that he was able to access 
information beyond Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI leading to him finding “other” 
narratives outside of the film’s ambit. Besides the New Order regime’s silver screen 
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indoctrination, the state had to ensure its propaganda was doubly effective by 
adding to its coterie of weapons, a vast series of state-sponsored museums.30 
National museums are required elements within a country’s larger nation-
building scheme, and after the events of 1965, the site where the generals were 
buried was transformed into a national shrine in Jakarta. Similar shrines were also 
erected all across Indonesia with schoolchildren being similarly made to “worship” 
at these sites. This turned out to be a nightmarish experience for Sebastian Partogi 
visiting the memorial of one of the murdered generals. Partogi recounts the 
violent story told by the tour guide of how the general had died. He particularly 
remembers the bloodstains still visible on the floor. The visit left him unnerved as 
“these horrors stories were told to [them] without explanation as to what caused 
the events of 1965. Even in elementary school, explanations about the PKI who 
were supposedly behind the sadistic murders of the generals were not done in-
depth. [Schoolchildren] were fed with these abstract concepts, which only gave 
[them] more questions when [they] became adults . . . . it was as if the incident just 
occurred out of nowhere, without an antecedent or any clear moral narrative, only 
to leave [them] with a sense of fear.”
Indonesians live with ghosts, specifically the ghosts of 1965. As we have seen 
from the writings of several contributors to Ingat 65, the event itself seems “absurd” 
without being able to stand on any kind of logical footing. It is a conundrum 
shrouded in a silence perpetuated by the both the government and the previous 
generation of Indonesians. Thus, when Nurdiyanshah Dalidjo visited several places 
where the suspected leftists and PKI members were massacred to seek answers, he 
was met only with ghosts. 
Yu Lik (a local contact) also told us about spring where people had their throats cut. 
They had their ears cut off and then were placed together on a stick to be shown to the 
others in the village as a way of terrorizing the rest . . . . some were thrown into a valley 
as well as the Brantas River which is the second longest river in Java . . . there were many 
bodies then which flowed down the river muddying its colour with blood . . . there are 
no official numbers as to how many died. Many say the numbers are between hundreds 
of thousands to millions.
While official numbers have been proffered by the state, the numbers are often 
very contentious and contested. Locals living nearby by these killing fields are often 
reticent to speak of the exact locations but they tend be near rivers or caves. Very 
often those living close to these places consider them to be angker or haunted. 
According to Nurdiyanshah, these haunted places are often accompanied by the 
smell “of blood or burnt rotting flesh.” Such haunted places tend to be avoided 
and be off limits due their “tainted” nature. Ghosts and spirits often represent a 
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lingering presence which remains because it is part of an “incomplete” story. The 
“ghosts” which inhabit such places of suffering, murder, and massacre are there 
precisely because of a “rupture” which cannot be explained logically. Therefore, 
these phantasms will remain there as long as the past is not “exorcised.” 
CREATING COMMUNITY
The events of 1965 and the mass killings that followed present several problems. 
First, it is a silenced event with no clear indication of the numbers murdered. 
Second, right-wing groups and the government are unable to recognize that the 
killings have taken place and continue to raise the specter of the PKI to pressure 
victims into silence. However, Ingat 65’s presence as a group of younger people is 
now beginning to engage in the most important aspect of reconciling Indonesia 
with its past by questioning the New Order legacy. Among the obvious elements 
of this legacy are fear, “ruptures,” and absurdity. These elements alert us to the 
fear of families and Indonesians in either speaking out about the killings or even 
mentioning the term PKI. With this enforced “silence” comes a fear that if one were 
to speak out, there is a likely chance that one would be suspected of PKI sympathies 
and thus incur the wrath of the state. The immediate consequence is the requirement 
for citizens to be loyal to the state regardless of its actions. Any attempt at speaking 
out on human rights issues will often automatically earn one the moniker “PKI.” 
Given the mythologized nature of the events of 1965, questioning its logic is not 
encouraged, thus often leaving children wondering as to the truth of what truly 
happened. This “rupture” leads the younger generation to the only other source 
of information on Indonesian history: the state. However, the New Order’s ability 
to “explain” is very limited, placing much emphasis on demonization, gore, blood, 
and graphic violence. Either the children grow up with an illogically intense hatred 
against the PKI, or they develop an innate sense of confusion towards a national 
history which is filled with violent propagandist imagery. What we have out of this 
condition is, as I mentioned earlier in the article, a “politics of nothingness.”
In present-day Indonesia, with its more open environment, the presence of 
the internet allows communities, whether real or virtual, to flourish. Given that, 
answers are not readily available and the younger generation utilizes the internet 
to create virtual mnemonic communities in trying to “fill in the gaps” as to their 
understanding of both their relationship with their parents and children as well as 
their nation. The “politics of nothingness” also provides a discursive place or what 
anthropologist Gabriel Gatti calls the “field.” He states that when the “field springs up 
. . . it begins to harbor life, however rare. And the life it harbors is diverse: routinized 
narratives, generational ways of doing, biographies, aesthetic languages” (9).  Gatti 
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continues by saying that while the field is inherently unstable, ever changing, and 
filled with myriad voices, it nonetheless becomes a visible existing “thing” (9). As 
these fields increase in number, as more Indonesians begin to realize that there 
are such spaces in which the they can access not necessarily as contributors but 
as “spectators,” it is likely that the present government will be placed under greater 
pressure to deal with the past. Nonetheless, before the government is able to come 
up with any concrete action, Ingat 65’s mnemonic community is already generating 
“new meanings” (Pickering and Keightly 91). But more importantly, the site, I posit, 
pushes against the continued silence of Indonesia over the events of 1965—perhaps 
providing the contributors an outlet for “many different forms of everyday creativity 
that help to give . . . lives structure and purpose, meaning and value” (Pickering and 
Keightly 165).
THE ROAD AHEAD
The events of 1965 and their aftermath represent a particular part of Indonesian 
history which cannot be “spoken of” and, at the same time, something which is also 
inexplicable. In the writings highlighted earlier in the article, the “inexplicability” 
of the events lie in the “gaps” caused not only by their taboo nature but also by 
their “incompleteness” due to state-sanctioned indoctrination. Therefore it can be 
assumed that the efforts of the young activists behind Ingat 65 is then to bridge the 
“gaps” and to explain the “inexplicable” as part of a greater desire for understanding. 
To better place the incident into perspective, we can assume that 1965 was made to 
appear as a foundational and yet traumatic event within the national consciousness. 
And like all traumatic events, it is “unpresentable” and “escapes language” especially 
for those who were later on victimized and stigmatized by the state. However, “there 
is wide agreement that the problem of unrepresentability should not deter people 
from trying to tell their stories of trauma . . . because the act of providing testimony 
is crucially important to healing in spite of its known inadequacy in terms of 
recalling and retelling events” (Arthur 69). While “healing” remains an amorphous 
term, there is nonetheless a need to allow for these narratives to arise not only as 
a means for catharsis but also as a place for these experiences, stories, and insights 
to have a “definable space.” As such, the medium of the internet “closely reflects the 
fragments, shattered, volatile and often incoherent experience of trauma and the 
attempts to describe it. It offers a non-linear, distributed format which can contain 
narrative but is not itself narrative” (Arthur 69). In other words, Ingat 65 and the 
medium of the internet provide a “non-linear” space in which these narratives can 
be “framed,” making them much more visible, and therefore challenging the taboo 
surrounding 1965. 
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However, while this frame serves as constitutive point in which to further spark 
discussions on 1965, it could also be taken advantage of by actors for their own 
agenda at the same time. During an outreach event in 2016, volunteers of Ingat 
65 set up a booth to attract a greater audience. People who approached the booth 
were then encouraged to take a photographs which would then be posted on social 
network platforms. These very same photos were however downloaded and then 
used by right-wing groups accusing those in the pictures of being part of a “neo-PKI” 
movement complete with hand signs which signified membership to the group. 
The idea of communism or the “latent danger” of the PKI, waiting in the shadows to 
“infect” unwitting Indonesians has been a major theme used to maintain a climate 
of fear, uncertainty, and mistrust. 
Violent right-wing groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (Fron Pembela 
Islam or FPI) and the Anti-Communist Front (Fron Anti Komunis Indonesia or 
FAKI) have been capitalizing on this “phantom,” suppressing any effort which 
they deem to be supporting the rebirth of the PKI. Disrupting film screenings, 
discussions, and even meetings of former political detainees, both FAKI and the 
FPI often use physical force and intimidation to generate enough “noise” to deter 
any efforts in revisiting the events of 1965. I posit that these groups seek to induce 
both silence and ultimately amnesia through violence. This was an oft-repeated 
pattern throughout the New Order regime, with numerous incidents of human 
rights violations and what continues to be “cold cases.” Even with the present 
Indonesian president Joko Widodo’s assurances that the state would investigate, 
these cases of alleged violations remain in administrative oblivion. Fearing that 
this impunity would continue, the founders of Ingat 65 were intent on ending the 
silence that gave shelter to these purported crimes. As such Ingat 65 becomes what 
Tamar Ashuri refers to as a “moral mnemonic agent” where the “individual agent 
recall his/her memories of wrongdoing before large audiences with the intention of 
drawing attention to such marginalized or even denied occurances” (107). Drawing 
from research on websites which curates the narratives of “moral witnesses” or 
direct witnesses of the Holocaust, Ashuri states that these online platforms serve 
as moral mnemonic agents which makes the suffering of victims, “visible and hence 
difficult to marginalize or deny” (109). Given that the Holocaust was difficult for 
the survivors to “explicate” on, Ashuri states that these moral mnemonic agents 
provide a mediatory role in highlighting their stories to create, “a moral community 
that will ‘hear’ the cry and acknowledge the pain, and thereby usher in a new order” 
(109). 
Unlike the Holocaust, which has been generally recognized as a crime against 
humanity, 1965 remains an amorphous event that the Indonesian state would prefer 
to remain a nonentity. Thus Ingat 65 takes on the dual “moral” roles of encouraging 
witnesses to speak and at the same time creating a community/space to break the 
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silence surrounding the event. Its presence takes away the “agency” from right-
wing groups employing New Order style violence and returns it into the hands 
of not just ex-political prisoners but also of a populace held hostage by phantoms, 
violence, and right-wing extremism. These websites then become what Amit 
Pinchevski refers to as an “inter-archive” which “presents new opportunities for the 
construction of collective memory, away from and beyond national or genealogical 
constraints” (256). While physical archives remains well within the state’s influence, 
the internet provides mnemonic communities “active involvement and personal 
investment, and hence imagination as much as recollection” (256). Ultimately, to 
break Indonesia’s cycle of fear and away from the ghosts of the past, Indonesia 
must learn to form communities which have the space and capacity to “imagine” it 
differently. It must therefore learn to “unsilence” the past. In order to do so, it has 
to learn speak to its phantoms for them to be exorcised.
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Notes
1. Ingat 65 website can be found at https://medium.com/ingat-65.
2. For the earliest academic account on the 1965 event, please refer to Benedict 
Anderson and Ruth Mcvey’s “A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup 
in Indonesia.” Interim Reports Series. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971. 
Another important comprehensive account is John Roosa’s Pretext for Mass 
Murder: The 30th of September Movement and Suharto’s Coup D’etat in Indonesia. 
U of Wisconsin P, 2006.
3. Reknowned Indonesianist and historian Geoffrey Robinson offers several different 
perspectives as to who the exact masterminds of the event were in a recently 
published monograph entitled The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian 
Massacres 1965-6. Princeton UP, 2018.
4. To gain a better understanding of the geopolitical nature of the 1965 event, please 
refer to Bradley Simpson’s “International Dimensions of the 1965-68 Violence in 
Indonesia.” Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia 1965-68, edited by Douglas 
Kammen and Katherine McGregor, National U of Singapore P, 2012, pp. 50-74. 
Simpson further expands on this theme by taking into consideration Indonesia’s 
internal economic conditions in his Economists with Guns: Authoritarian 
Development and US-Indonesia Relations, 1960-1968. Stanford UP, 2008.
5. Pramoedya also spent more than a decade in detention, being moved from one 
facility to another until he reached the penal colony of Buru Island. He was 
detained from the mid-1960s until the end of the 1970s. For an in-depth look into 
the nature of his detention and the conditions of Buru Island, please see A Mute’s 
Soliloquy: A Memoir. Penguin, 2000.
6. The most in-depth treatment of the “memorialization” of this event by the New 
Order can be found in Katherine McGregor’s History in Uniform: Military 
Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia’s Past. National U of Singapore P, 2007.
7. Gerwani members were accused by the state not only of torture but also of cutting 
off the genitals of the officers and then dancing on top of their bodies. Sociologist 
Saskia Wieringa’s work  “disassembles” this imagery of Gerwani, highlighting 
how the New Order’s “sexual slander” sowed fear into the populace warning of 
what would happen should the PKI come to power and with it the unleashing 
of “uncontrolled female energies.” For more information, please refer to Saskia 
Wieringa’s “Sexual Slander and the 1965/66 Mass Killings in Indonesia: Political 
and Methodological Considerations.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 41, no. 4, 
2011, pp. 544-565.
8. The title of the film roughly translates to “The Treachery of the G30S/PKI” and 
takes inspiration from the official perspective written by state historians Nugroho 
Nutosusanto, Sartono Kartodirjo, and Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro. For more 
information, please see “Sejarah Nasional Indonesia” Departemen Pendidikan 
dan Kebudayaan, Jakarta 1975.
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9. These five principles, known collectively as Pancasila, are required to be 
memorized by citizens and encompass elements such as belief in one God, a just 
and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, guided democracy under the wise 
guidance of representative consultations, and social justice for all Indonesians.
10. It must however, be considered that Wahid made the apology as a NU leader 
and not so much as the president of the Republic of Indonesia. His apology, 
compounded by other factors, then led him to eventually step down from his post 
as Indonesian president in 2004.
11. For an excellent collection of academic articles on this issue, please refer to The 
Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, edited by Robert 
Cribb, Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990.
12. The BBC’s Indonesian service gave the symposium in-depth coverage 
and was largely sympathetic to the event, one of their reports noted that 
the symposium would bring Indonesia closer to reconciliation. For more 
information please, see Isyana Artharini’s report, “Simposium 65 diharapkan 
‘membangun rekonsiliasi.” 18 April 2016, http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/
berita_indonesia/2016/04/160417_indonesia_simposium_65.
13. For more info please see the Anton Hermansyah’s report for The Jakarta Post,  
“1965 Symposium Indonesia’s way to face its dark past.” 19 April 2016, http://www.
thejakartapost.com/news/2016/04/19/1965-symposium-indonesias-way-to-face-
its-dark-past.html.
14. For more information, please see “Thousands rally in Indonesia capital against 
communism” by Chadni Vatvani, Channel News Asia, 3 June 2016, http://www.
channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/thousands-rally-in/2843346.html.
15. Please see “Indonesia refuses to investigate on 1965-66 anti-communist purges 
despite recognition of remorse,” International Centre for Peace and Human Rights, 
19 Apr. 2016, http://www.cipadh.org/en/indonesia-refuses-investigate-1965-66-
anti-communist-purges-despite-recognition-of-remorse.
16. Please see Marguerite Afra Sapiie’s “Plan to set up ‘harmony’ council met 
with criticism,” Jakarta Post, 11 Jan. 2017, http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2017/01/11/plan-set-harmony-council-met-with-criticism.html.
17. For more information on its activities as well as “judgements” and “opinions” 
please refer to this website: http://www.tribunal1965.org.
18. Please see Febriana Firdaus’s “Aliansi Anti-Komunis Indonesia ‘jemput’ 
tim IPT 1965 di Bandara,” Rappler, 16 Nov. 2015, http://www.rappler.com/
indonesia/112911-aliansi-anti-komunis-indonesia-tim-ipt-1965.
19. The author of this Guardian article provides an interesting insight into the 
reactions of the audience, mostly Indonesians being shown The Act of Killing 
for the first time. Please refer to it in Mette Bjerregaard’s “What Indonesians 
really think about The Act of Killing.” The Guardian, 5 Mar. 2014, https://www.
theguardian.com/film/2014/mar/05/act-of-killing-screening-in-indonesia. 
20. For an in-depth academic discussion of the film, please refer to Critical Asian 
Studies special edition on Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing. Please see 
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“The Act of Killing: A CAS Roundtable.” Critical Asian Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 2014, 
pp. 145-146. 
21. One of the best collection of testimonies is Tahun Yang Tak Pernah Berakhir: 
Memahami Pengalaman Korban, edited by John Roosa, Ayu Ratih, and Hilmar 
Farid, Elsam, 2004. For a Balinese perspective on the 1965 pogroms, please see 
Melawan Lupa: Narasi-Narasi Komunitas Taman 65 Bali, edited by Agung 
Wardana, Roberto Hutabarat, and Wiss Hardana Putra, Taman 65 Press, 2012.
22. For more information, please refer to “Pimpinan Komunis Gaya Baru, Anak dari Wakil 
CC PKI Zaman Aidit” in http://news.okezone.com/read/2016/06/03/337/1405900/
pimpinan-komunis-gaya-baru-anak-dari-wakil-cc-pki-zaman-aidit.
23. A change in Indonesia’s the socio-economic environment in the 1980s brought 
about a “consolidation” among labor groups, the middle classes, as well as 
students. The relationship was further strengthened in the 1990s when these 
groups began experimenting with terms such as human rights and reform. 
The lynchpin however was the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the “reforms” 
dictated by foreign financial institutions. Coupled with wide spread popular anger 
and mounting protests led by students, president Suharto finally stepped down in 
May 1998. For more information, please refer to Democratization in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia, edited by Marco Bunte and Andreas Ufen, Routledge, 2009.
24. For more information, please see Sita W. Dewi and Margareth S. Aritonang’s 
“Kidnapped Activists Pin Hopes on Jokowi-Kalla,” The Jakarta Post, 5 July 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/05/kidnapped-activists-pin-
hopes-jokowi-kalla.html.
25. The actual term used in New Order speak is “tidak bersih linkungan.” For more 
New Order parlance, please refer to Hersri Setiawan’s Kamus Gestok. Galangpress, 
2003.
26. In his memoir, Jusuf Wanandi, an influential Suharto-era policy analyst, 
approximates the number of political detainees to be 600,000 in 1971.  The 
detainees were placed in categories “A” for those were accused of being involved 
in the G30S coup attempt with legal “evidence”; “B” were those accused of being 
involved but without “legal evidence”; and  “C” were detainees arrested based on 
mere suspicion of their involvement. For more information please see Shades of 
Grey: A Political Memoir of Indonesia, 1965-1998. Equinox Press, 2012.
27. The Khmer Rouge which gained power in 1973, implemented categories for 
its citizens differentiating “new people” from “old people.” Almost everyone 
suspected of having ties with the previous regime before the Khmer Rouge and 
alleged “subversives” were then sent to various death camps (of which one is the 
infamous Tuol Sleng/S-21) where most would die from torture, hard labor, and 
malnutrition. For more information please refer to David Chandler’s Voices from 
S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison and Francois Bizot’s excellent 
autobiography, The Gate. Bizot is the only foreigner to have survived one of the 
Khmer Rouge’s death camps.
28. For a more in-depth discussion of this concept, please refer to Kar Yen Leong’s 
“Exorcising Ghosts and Phantasms: Reinterpreting Indonesia’s Past through 
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unseen Realms,” conference presentation on Reconciling Indonesian History with 
1965, 10-12 November 2016, Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany.
29. This concept was pointed out by Katherine McGregor in her study of young 
activists working on the issue of reconciliation between a mass-based Muslim 
organization Nadhalatul Ulama and former political prisoners. For more 
information, please see “Memory Studies and Human Rights in Indonesia.” Asian 
Studies Review, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 350-361.
30. During the New Order period, the state spared no expense embarking on 
constructing museums as a way of “showcasing” the nation. For more information, 
please refer to Klaus H. Schreiner’s “History in the Showcase: Representations 
of National History in Indonesian Museums” in Nationalism and Cultural 
Revival in Southeast Asia: Perspective from the Centre and the Region, edited by 
Sri Kuhnt-Saptodewa, Volker Grabowsky, and Marthin Groβheim, Harrassowitz 
Verlag, 1997, pp. 99-118.
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